I use that overflow check pattern all the time, how is that undefined? size_t should always be unsigned unless gcc in early 90s maybe where they didn't follow the standard exactly. I think that checker is too sensitive. What about a username and password length check some small value like 1k instead of some chunk of size_t max

Ah yes, I was a bit "blinded" by the warning so I didn't think properly. It actually shouldn't be undefined, no...

What about a username and password length check some small value like 1k instead of some chunk of size_t max

Yeah, I think that would make sense and would actually probably help to detect errors earlier and better...

ok how about this

diff --git a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
index 5d61ce6..b9a9be0 100644
--- a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
+++ b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message(struct Curl_easy *data,
   plen = strlen(passwdp);
 
   /* Compute binary message length. Check for overflows. */
-  if((ulen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) || (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2)))
+  if(ulen > 1024 || plen > 1024)
     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
   plainlen = 2 * ulen + plen + 2;