On Thu, 19 Apr 2012, Paul Bakker wrote:

> This seems to be a 'HTTP over TLS'-specific error.

I'm not an TLS/x509 expert but I don't think so. Also, you'll see that for
example GnuTLS agrees with my view here and this is how we do it for OpenSSL
(for all TLS-using protocols). I haven't checked how the other libs like
cyassl or axtls think of this.

Are you saying someone actually wants PolarSSL to work the way it works now?

> In RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS) it is stated that this behaviour is as such. RFC
> 5280, governing the generic X509 handling, does not state this behaviour and
> desribes that the CN is still a valid name to check. The SSL/TLS guidelines
> themselves do not discuss this handling any further.
>
> But there may be another RFC that governs this that I have missed. Can
> anybody else confirm or counter that this is HTTP over TLS specific and not
> SSL/TLS generic?

RFC 6125 is quite specific in section 6.3:

       Security Warning: A client MUST NOT seek a match for a reference
       identifier of CN-ID if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID,
       SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types
       supported by the client.

(DNS-ID being the name used there for Subject Alternative Name)

-- 
  / daniel.haxx.se
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